AUSA Preview: CSA Interview Highlights & My Thoughts on the Future of FLRAA and OMFV
BLUF: Army shifting to a portfolio approach for Autonomous Systems, C-UAS, and EW; exploring missile collaboration with USAF; expect more program cancellations.
My interpretation of the CSA’s key remarks
* Link to the Defense and Aerospace Report’s Full Interview - HERE
Shift to a capability-centric portfolio approach
The CSA signaled a shift from a program-centric to a portfolio-based execution model, initially focusing on autonomous systems, C-UAS, and EW. These areas are characterized by rapid technological advancement (often measured in days).
NOTE: For more details on the portfolio approach, please refer to recommendation #36 from the Section 809 Panel and recommendation #1 from the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption.
As part of this shift, the Army will prioritize broader requirements encompassing the entire capability portfolio rather than individual systems. This will likely entail some degree of program element consolidation in the FY26 PB request. The Army will avoid long-term, winner-take-all contracts and prioritize tranche-style procurement. This means equipping units with systems based on the latest available technology and evolving threats rather than standardizing on a single system across the entire force.
To achieve this desired level of budget execution flexibility, the Army is likely to seek legislative authorities similar to those granted to DIU in last year's Appropriations Bill. Specifically, Section 8141 “provides the authority for DIU Fielding funds for expenses related to agile research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, production modification, and operation and maintenance requirements, including the initial acquisition of end-items for operational use.”
USAF programmatic collaboration
The CSA mentioned ongoing discussions with the USAF focused on leveraging missile systems for Army air defense applications and collaborating on developing next-generation missiles. The intent is to decrease unit costs through aggregate demand/EOQ savings. While the CSA was not specific, this could include the AIM-120 AMRAAM and its successor, the AIM-260 JATM. The AIM-9X Sidewinder is another possibility.
While speculative, the Army may be considering acquiring additional NASAMS systems. The AIM-120 and AIM-9X can be integrated with NASAMS launchers, which are also in service with multiple FMS partners. These missiles could also be intended for the IFPC Inc 2 program, which already utilizes the AIM-9X.
Two other USAF missile programs worth pointing out are the Small Advanced Capabilities Missile (SACM) and the Miniature Self-Defense Missile (MSDM). These programs are still in their RDT&E phases, and their future fielding remains uncertain. However, both missiles are characterized by their smaller size and lower cost, making them attractive options for increasing the magazine depth of Army M-SHORAD units.
More programs are likely to be canceled
The CSA was not specific but alluded to new apps in the network/C2 space that could replace a vehicle, several radios, and several people. He then said, “We’re going to have to cancel other things” and ensure the focus is on “war-winning capabilities.”
What programs might those be?
In this section, I’ll share some preliminary thoughts on two of the Army’s more noteworthy programs, FLRAA and OMFV. I want to emphasize that these reflections are subjective, based on publicly available information. The intent is to help initiate a more focused discussion on some very challenging trade-space decisions. Future posts might cover other Army modernization priorities.
In my view, current and emerging operational challenges call for additional investment in the following capability areas:
Robotic ground vehicles
Air defense of all types
Small unit ISR, counter-ISR, and precision fires
Mass casualty care and evacuation
Logistics enablers
Command post mobility / distributed and resilient BMC2
Magazine depth
Some of these capabilities involve expanding existing programs, while others may require the creation of entirely new ones. This all comes on top of the Army's existing modernization roadmap.
Sufficiently funding these capability areas will inevitably require programmatic cuts, delays, or outright cancellations to other parts of the modernization budget. The CSA's remarks seem to all but confirm this. Additionally, hacking force structure and degrading readiness are typically levers pulled after scaling back on modernization.
FLRAA
The program reached Milestone B this past August, an encouraging signal of the Army’s commitment. The Army can now begin the detailed design and construction of six prototype aircraft. The first FLRAA prototype test flight is scheduled for 2026, with low-rate initial production planned for 2028 and initial fielding set for 2030.
However, a lot can change between now and 2030. Protecting FLRAA funding will be challenging amid a growing list of priorities, all competing for limited resources. Additionally, a dynamic threat environment requires continued scrutiny of how FLRAA could be deployed in operational scenarios. Based on these discussions and evolving threat assessments, we might see a reduction in procurement quantities or Total Obligation Authority if FLRAA’s mission scope narrows.
Specifically, while FLRAA’s range and speed provide commanders with enhanced operational flexibility, its role may shift away from frontline troop transport or inserting forces behind enemy lines to that of an intra-theater logistics enabler. This role would focus on rapidly transporting reinforcements and supplies between embarkation points in operational support areas to division or brigade resupply points, aiming to remain outside AA range. Resupply to the FLOT would likely entail ground or UAS modes of transportation.
The key question is whether FLRAA’s increased range and speed will have a meaningful impact on the outcome of envisioned battles with RU or PRC forces. This is why wargaming and operational testing are so critical. The analysis should be data-driven and objective, allowing the results to speak for themselves.
In my view, outright cancellation is unlikely, but the FY26 FYDP will be a key indicator of potential program delays and/or reductions. If the Army does not advocate more forcefully for accelerated fielding, it could signal a shift in priorities toward other programs and a willingness to let FLRAA fielding slip further to the right.
OMFV/XM-30
The Army plans to transition the XM-30 program from a Middle Tier Acquisition-Rapid Prototyping Pathway to a Major Capability Acquisition Pathway at Milestone B in Q2 FY25, with LRIP anticipated in Q1 FY28 and FRP around FY30. However, as with the FLRAA, much can change between now and 2030.
A key question is whether the XM-30’s capability improvements over a modernized Bradley would be sufficient to justify the higher costs, assuming the XM-30 is the more expensive option. To this point, it’s essential to consider cost not only on a per-unit basis but also in terms of establishing new supply chains, manufacturing lines, and training programs. Additionally, should a modernized Bradley share the same chassis as the AMPV family of vehicles, any potential lifecycle sustainment and EOQ savings must also be factored in. Put another way, what’s the threshold at which cost savings are worth the political challenges of a major program pivot, provided there is minimal impact on operational success? Conversely, one could also ask whether the AMPV family of vehicles should eventually be based on the XM-30 platform.
The Army’s emphasis on “formation-based lethality” is another critical factor in any XM-30 / modernized Bradley comparison. This approach prioritizes how systems interact within a formation and are employed collectively to achieve a desired effect rather than focusing on the performance of individual systems.
In this context, the Army is particularly focused on the potential of RCVs and human-machine teaming, with two primary objectives: having machines make initial contact with the enemy and taking on tasks like EW, C-UAS, active/passive protection, and ISR. By offloading these capabilities and their associated sensors to RCVs, the Army aims to reduce the weight and complexity of crewed platforms, thereby improving both strategic and tactical mobility.
For the sake of discussion, in a resource-constrained environment, what would be the optimal approach: fully executing the XM-30 program but only a limited number of RCVs or investing in a less expensive modernized Bradley that could be paired with a larger number of RCVs?
To be clear, there are many other potential trade-space options that could free up resources to fully support the XM-30 and RCV programs. However, any decision will inevitably come with an opportunity cost elsewhere within the Army’s modernization portfolio. While I would love nothing more than to see a brand new XM-30 fielded, I remain skeptical the capability delta over a modernized Bradley is enough to justify those opportunity costs. Do I see a cancellation in OMFV's future? No, but just like with FLRRA, I think it's possible that XM-30 will get pushed to the right.
Again, some humble thoughts here and looking forward to seeing what comes out of this year’s AUSA!